“E.M. Cioran, or God Doesn’t Wear a Cane” (Andrei Codrescu)

Originally published in the American Book Review, vol. 1, no. 5, December/January 1978

In my bed of pain, with a crown of ice cubes araund my foot, I was proof that Paris is the best skateboarding town in the world. The square at St. Sulpice had run from under me like Los Angeles had from under Fred Astaire, to show me, possibly, that I wasn’t as young as my son. But the pain in my foot wasn’t as bad as the ache in my heart because now I couldn’t see the hero of my adolescence with whom, by clever and devious means, I had obtained an interview. I looked over the radiator at the roofs of Montparnasse eight floors down, and called Emil Cioran to tell him that I couldn’t make it that evening, that I was a cripple.

It is not pity, it is envy the tragic hero inspires in us, that lucky devil whose sufferings we devour as if we were entitied to them and he had cheated us of them. Why not try to take them back from him? In any case, they were meant for us … To be alI the more certain of that, we declare them our own, aggrandize them and give them excessive proportions; grappIe or groan before us as he will, he cannot move us, for we are not his spectators but his rivals, his competitors in the theatre, capable of supporting his miseries better than he is … (The Temptation to Exist 194)

Ever since I remember (and my memory only goes as far as my literate beginnings) I experienced that frisson of awe and envy at mention of Cioran’s name. Born in my hometown of Sibiu in Transylvania, he was a legend before I read him. Forbidden by the Communists, his books bumed with a flame that went way beyond their content, In the Iycee (the same one he had attended) I would positively dissolve at the thought that one day I might be good enough to meet him. The dazzling fantasy of being in Paris talking to Emil Cioran exhausted me. Here I was, at the core of my fantasy, unable to shake his hand. I was a tragic hero, not because of my wounded foot which they might or might not saw off, but because I couldn ‘t see him… [+]

Cioran: the burden of existence

Preludes and Refrains

Is it the knowledge of good and evil or the expulsion from the garden that constitutes man’s original sin? Whatever the case, it is at least plausible that “we are still not thinking”. Modernity, then, is still an “unfinished project” inasmuch as we have yet to think. And yet the original moment of “disenchantment” that dispelled the old gods continues to go under the name of an “idolatrous” science. We fail to think and yet it is because we are so successful at being dialectical that we have returned to the need for the old mythologies of earth, spirit, and the Absolute. In other words, true to form, it is our failure to be dialectical (we have not yet, it seems, reached the end of history) that indicates our great success at being dialectical.

This is why, because our philosophy has called us from slumber, insomnia and boredom are the…

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“Why do anything? A meditation on procrastination” (Costica Bradatan)

“Gnostic thinking takes us to a privileged ontological realm: the state of perfection that precedes actualization. That which is yet to be born — be it the world, a person, a piece of furniture or a piece of writing like this one — may be nothing, but at this stage it is at its utmost. Its nothingness is fuller and richer than any ordinary existence. To fall into existence is to enter time, and with time comes decay, aging and death. Modern proponents of this idea are hard to come by, but the Romanian-born French philosopher E.M. Cioran is certainly one. For Cioran, who died in 1995, there was something incomparably worse than death — ‘the catastrophe of birth,’ and the ‘fall in time’ that comes with it. In his book The Trouble With Being Born, Cioran maps out the vast unfolding of nothingness that preceded coming into existence.” (Costica Bradatan)

(Leigh Wells)

The New York Times (“The Opinion Pages”), 17 September, 2016

Have you heard the story of the architect from Shiraz who designed the world’s most beautiful mosque? No one had ever conjured up such a design. It was breathtakingly daring yet well-proportioned, divinely sophisticated, yet radiating a distinctly human warmth. Those who saw the plans were awe-struck.

Famous builders begged the architect to allow them to erect the mosque; wealthy people came from afar to buy the plans; thieves devised schemes to steal them; powerful rulers considered taking them by force. Yet the architect locked himself in his study, and after staring at the plans for three days and three nights, burned them all.

The architect couldn’t stand the thought that the realized building would have been subject to the forces of degradation and decay, eventual collapse or destruction by barbarian hordes. During those days and nights in his study he saw his creation profaned and reduced to dust, and was terribly unsettled by the sight. Better that it remain perfect. Better that it was never built.

The story is a fable, but its main idea — that a thing’s ideal state is before it comes into existence, that it is better to not be born — is equal parts terrifying and uncanny, especially today, when progress and productivity are practically worshiped. And it evokes a philosophical insight with ancient roots that is still worth investigating.

“The world,” we read in the Gnostic Gospel of Philip, “came about through a mistake.” The demiurge who made it “wanted to create it imperishable and immortal,” but eventually he “fell short of attaining his desire, for the world never was imperishable, nor, for that matter, was he who made the world.” The Gnostics believed nonexistence to be a mark of perfection, and coming into being a form of degradation.

Basilides, one of the most intriguing figures of early Gnosticism, believed that the highest attribute of divinity is its inexistence. By his own account, Basilides was a theologian of the “nonexistent God”; he referred to God as “he who is not,” as opposed to the maker of the world, trapped in existence and time.

Gnostic thinking takes us to a privileged ontological realm: the state of perfection that precedes actualization. That which is yet to be born — be it the world, a person, a piece of furniture or a piece of writing like this one — may be nothing, but at this stage it is at its utmost. Its nothingness is fuller and richer than any ordinary existence. To fall into existence is to enter time, and with time comes decay, aging and death.

Modern proponents of this idea are hard to come by, but the Romanian-born French philosopher E.M. Cioran is certainly one. For Cioran, who died in 1995, there was something incomparably worse than death — “the catastrophe of birth,” and the “fall in time” that comes with it. In his book “The Trouble With Being Born,” Cioran maps out the vast unfolding of nothingness that preceded coming into existence.

“I am lured only by what precedes me,” he writes, by “the numberless moments when I was not: the non-born.” From that perspective, he looks at the world with new eyes, and gains a deeper understanding of himself: “I have never taken myself for a being. A noncitizen, a marginal type, a nothing who exists only by the excess, by the superabundance of his nothingness.”

Cioran was a man of unusual tastes. He took a liking to the Thracians because they “wept over the newborn,” and to the Gnostic sect of Bogomils, who, “in order to justify God, held Satan responsible for the infamy of Creation.”

All of this raises an obvious question: Why do anything? Why multiply the cosmic failure, the “infamy of creation”?

Idleness, as we know, has a bad rap in Western culture, but it can be a philosophical experience in its own right. Bertrand Russell wrote a long essay in praise of it, and Oscar Wilde thought that “to do nothing at all is the most difficult thing in the world” as well as the most intellectual. The great, consummate idlers of literature (Ivan Goncharov’s Oblomov or Melville’s Bartleby) are figures of metaphysical quest: They exemplify ways of being human with unusual complexity.

Idleness, then, reveals an experience of nothingness. While nothingness tends to occupy a central position in Eastern traditions like Buddhism and Taoism, we in the West typically shun it; after all, one of the most characteristic branches of Western philosophy is ontology, the study of that which exists.

Yet, even if we do not choose to embrace nothingness, nothingness itself may choose to embrace us. It may not be that we don’t have anything to do, or that we’re bored, or that we would rather do it later, but just that we don’t see the point of it all. In our idleness we intuit a cosmic meaninglessness, which comes along with the realization that, with every action, we get only more entangled in the universal farce.

Perhaps the most intriguing form of idleness is one nearly all of us are intimately familiar with: procrastination. Idleness is difficult to find in a pure state. Indeed, in a certain sense, it eludes us because, at its most radical, idleness tends to devour its devotees (again, Oblomov and Bartleby). But procrastination is a different business altogether: It is not only more available, but also more dynamic, just as the procrastinator is a more dramatic figure than the idler, who is as ascetic and immobile as a pillar saint.

The drama of procrastination comes from its split nature. Just like the architect from Shiraz, the procrastinator is smitten by the perfect picture of that which is yet to be born; he falls under the spell of all that purity and splendor. What he is beholding is something whole, uncorrupted by time, untainted by the workings of a messed-up world. At the same time, though, the procrastinator is fully aware that all that has to go. No sooner does he get a glimpse of the perfection that precedes actualization than he is doomed to become part of the actualization process himself, to be the one who defaces the ideal and brings into the world a precarious copy, unlike the architect who saves it by burning the plans.

The procrastinator contemplates his deed and realizes all its future imperfection, but — fallen creature, “man of the world,” part of the “infamy of Creation” that he is — he must do it. The procrastinator is both contemplator and man of action, which is the worst thing to be, and which is tearing him apart.

What procrastination betrays is above all an anxiety of creation: It pains us unbearably to realize that, for all our good intentions, we are agents of degradation, that instead of creating something that stays whole and incorruptible, we by our very doing make it “perishable and mortal,” in the words of the Gnostic author of the Gospel of Philip. Procrastination and mourning are tied tightly together: for to procrastinate is to mourn the precariousness of your creation even before you bring it into the world.

We should perhaps spend more time dwelling on the rich virtuality that precedes the fall into existence. That is, after all, what true contemplation must be about: a commerce with the irreality of things, a learned habit to see them from the privileged perspective of their pre- and nonexistence. Rather than get caught up in the misleading appearance of the material world, we transport ourselves back to a moment when the world, with all its holes and imperfections, hasn’t happened yet.

Book review: “The Temptation to Exist” (The Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1986)

By David Rodman Smith (professor of literature at Caltech and co-translator of selected Gobineau short stories being published by University of California Press).

The Temptation to Exist: by E. M. Cioran; translated by Richard Howard; introduction by Susan Sontag (Seaver: $17.95; 223 pp.)

Source: The Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1986

If you would like to know what philosophizing was like in the ’50s, particularly in Paris, you might well try E. M. Cioran’s “The Temptation to Exist,” but if you already know those times, these essays may produce groans of, “Aw, c’mon, not that again.” Yet, “The Temptation to Exist” is an “underground classic.” It first appeared in France in 1956, was subsequently translated by Richard Howard and published in the United States in 1968, with an introduction by Susan Sontag. This re-publication, which will give Cioran new readers, testifies to its staying power, though despite its stature and the admonition of both Cioran and Sontag against historicising (which sucked the marrow out of philosophy’s abstractionist bones), the book has aged and entered history.

Little known in this country, Cioran may be the most distinguished contemporary in a line descending from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, whom he resembles in his avoidance of traditional modes of philosophical discourse. He employs instead the personal essay, developing it lyrically, surprisingly, from paradox to aphorism: “Masters in the art of thinking against oneself, Nietzsche, Baudelaire and Dostoevsky have taught us to side with our dangers, to broaden the sphere of our disease, to acquire existence by division from our being.” The phrase, “thinking against oneself,” provides the title of the essays and suggests the explosively paradoxical nature of most of them.

But there are problems inherent in the style, for there is a danger that a manner so self-aware, commanding a matter so nebulous, will drift over the boundary between meaning and posture and put us in view of a literary Muscle Beach. Moreover, his wearing the mantle of the “tired European intellectual” may bore and his concern with “being and nothingness” appear a form of intellectual self-abuse. There are dangers in re-publication, 30 years being, perhaps, exactly the wrong delay.

Most of these essays operate within a central paradox, for while Cioran seeks the void where existence can be separated from being and thus asserted, he does not give up time and society. It is complexity forced on him by history, by what is for him Europe’s irreversible decline. Together, Europe and its decline give him responsibility for his own and society’s health and free him from it, place him both inside and outside of engagement and history. He holds to the aristocratic and romantic view of the healthy life by opposing the intellect (“Too much lucidity results in a loss of equilibrium”) and the free mind (“ultimately anti-social, detrimental to the health of the community”). Yet he attacks action (“Led on by the whirlwind of acts , I am nothing but an acolyte of time”) and seeks to free the intellect (“The only free mind is the one that, pure of all intimacy with beings or objects, plies its own vacuity”). At the risk of “a certain coquetry of the void,” as Sontag puts it (what for another might seem a pleasure in carrion, a lack of fresh air, too many Gauloises), the mind becomes its own subject, a voyeur of the self.

Son of an Orthodox priest, Cioran emigrated in 1937 from Romania, where he had been a student of philosophy, to France, where he has since lived and written. He has, he says, “no nationality–the best possible status for an intellectual.” Or, rather, he has taken on a more abstract nationality, for he is self-consciously and nostalgically a European with a sense of cultural fatigue and superiority looking back at national destinies which have run their course: “If, in the past, (national) died for the absurdity of glory, they abandon themselves now to a frenzy of small claims. ‘Happiness’ tempts them; it is their last prejudice, from which Marxism, that sin of optimism, derives its energy.” Or, “When a nation begins to show its age, it orients itself toward the condition of the masses.” He rejects this “coward’s pact,” which has replaced the ruthless energies that built past glories and holds to an aristocratic and organicist view of nations.

He brings to mind another who moved west and wrote in a second language, an aristocrat, but Joseph Conrad wanted “History not Theory.” For him, organicism and ideas of national destiny were a blind for Russian absolutism and mysticism, belief without an idea. One of his Russian characters calls the pragmatic and reasoned Western solutions to government “a pact with the Devil.” But Conrad admired the rational, whereas Cioran sees the Age of Enlightenment as the enemy.

Cioran’s Nietzsche (Willis G. Regier)

Source: French Forum, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 75-90
Author(s): Willis G. Regier
Published by: University of Nebraska Press

Cioran’s Nietzsche

Susan Sontag wrote that

Cioran comes after Nietzsche, who set down almost the whole of Cioran’s position a century ago. An interesting question: why does a subtle, powerful mind consent to say what has, for the most part, already been said? . . . Whatever the answer, the “fact” of Nietzsche has undeniable consequences for Cioran. He must tighten the screws, make the argument denser. More excruciating. More rhetorical.

Sontag’s essay has become a touchstone for taking Cioran seriously as a philosopher and the correlations between Cioran and Nietzsche she described are now staples of Cioran criticism.

Sontag’s junction of Cioran and Nietzsche has been steadily reinforced. As a postscript to his book on Nietzsche, Clément Rosset puts Cioran in the tradition of Nietzsche’s Gay Science and credits him for posing the most serious and most grave question to philosophy: whether an alliance is possible between lucidity and joy. Two of Cioran’s most esteemed translators, Ilinca Zarifopol- Johnson and Sanda Stolojan, separately asserted that Nietzsche was a major influence on Cioran in the 1930s. Cioran’s friend, the Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater, emphasized how much the two have in common. In a close comparison of Cioran’s Romanian works with Nietzsche’s books and Nachlass, Lucia Gorgoi found multiple similarities in style and substance, particularly regarding aphorisms and nihilism. Patrice Bollon’s summary of Cioran’s philosophy links it to Nietzsche more frequently than to any other philosopher.

Despite all this, Nietzsche and Cioran are a pair that ought not be taken for granted, for three reasons: affinity and resemblance are too easily mistaken for agreement and influence; Cioran strenuously resisted… [Pdf]

“The Fall out of Redemption: Writing and Thinking Beyond Salvation in Charles Baudelaire” (Joseph Acquisto)

In the nineteenth century and continuing to our own day, many atheist and agnostic writers have borrowed from a theological framework while refuting tenets of Christianity, especially the existence of a benevolent God and the possibility of redemption. Mid-nineteenth-century poet Charles Baudelaire goes further than many contemporary thinkers in identifying the consequences of refusing to entertain the possibility of salvation of any kind, whether by art, politics, or divine intervention. One important consequence is that he is able to create the possibility of a new, antimodern, ethics.

Joseph Acquisto joined the University of Vermont in 2003. He specializes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century French literature, with particular emphasis on lyric poetry and the novel. He is the author of numerous articles and several books, including his most recent, The Fall out of Redemption: Writing and Thinking Beyond Salvation in Baudelaire, Cioran, Fondane, Agamben, and Nancy (Bloomsbury, 2015). His teaching focuses on modern French literature and intermediate and advanced language courses. He serves as faculty director of the Global Village Residential Learning Community.

“The sceptic-on-duty” (Rüdiger Punzet)

The Hindu, 04 December 2010

Profoundly influenced by Buddhism and Hinduism, the Romanian philosopher E.M. Cioran saw life as a quest for the void

The American literary critic Susan Sontag called him the French Nietzsche, John Updike dubbed him a frustrated monk, and Bernhard-Henri Lévy described him as a “Dandy of the void beside whom even the stoics appear as zealous bon vivants”. The Romanian philosopher and essayist E.M. Cioran (1911-1995) is considered one of the most critical thinkers and radical nihilists of the 20th century. In spite of his intense engagement with the Indian and Eastern philosophies and his deep admiration for them, Cioran is hardly known in this part of the world. To many who come in contact with his works he appears as an “aristocrat of doubt”, an “ungodly mystique”, a “reactionary” and a “cynic”. Cioran’s prose confronts the reader with an author who imposes an unmatched climate of cold apocalypse and scathing scepticism. In his book Anathemas and Admirations Cioran calls himself “The sceptic-on-duty of a decaying world”. He chose the essay and aphorism in particular to express himself as he was convinced that they perfectly captured the epigrammatic intensity of his thoughts: “The aphorism is cultivated only by those who have known fear in the midst of words, that fear of collapsing with all the words”… [+]